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>i IN THE SUPREiME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
' ELLEN SMITH MOODY, and CHARLES .1 
. > MOODY, her husband, ..  1:~·~· \ . 
- ;...,..:·. ' . 
', 
Appellants and Plainiijfs, t. ~. •' ... ·· ..... ~ 
-vs.-
. - - -- .. - - . -- - . . -- -· . - - - -- . . . ---- - - - - ~ · . - . .._ -
·.··JUANITA c·. SMITH, individually, ~nd ! :: < ··;, l . :': r,:~, c- '~ ·: t , ,.J., !>:-;.> 
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian· of the 
. Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor, 
. JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHAEL 
· SMITH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and 
:.: RICHARD ROE, and all p.e:rsons unknown 
. claiming any right, title, estate or interest 
in and to the real property subject of this 
·-. -action, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys for Appellants 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN 'THE SUPRE;ME COURT 
of the 
STATE. OF UTAH 
ELLEN SMITH MOODY, and CHARLES 
MOODY, her husband, 
Appellants and Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
JUANITA C. SMITH, individually, and 
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian of the 
Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor, 
JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHAEL 
Sl\tiiTH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and 
RICHARD ROE, and all persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, estate or interest 
in and to the real property subject of this 
action, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
2100 
The Appellant, Ellen Smith Moody, the owner of an 
undivided one-fifth ( 1/5) interest in the David Smi~th 
Sheep Ranch, brought this action as a partition proceed-
ing against the other owners of the remaining four-
fifths ( 4/5) interests in said ranch, seeking to have her 
one-fifth share separated and decreed to her pursuant 
to the provisions of the U~tah Code Annotated relating 
io partitions. The Respondents, Josephine Smith Voda 
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and Rachel Smith Jensen, having entered into contracts 
to sell their respective interests to the defendants, Juanita 
Smith, individually, and Juanita Smith, as guardian for 
Dennis Smith, filed their Answers or disclaimers (R. 
41, 43), indicating no affirmative defenses and further 
relying upon the determination of the court as to their 
respective interests. For this reason, these two defend-
ants have not participated ,actively in the case. 
Defendant, Juanita Smith, individually and as said 
guardian, filed a Counter-Claim, setting up an alleged 
contract between the plaintiff and said defendants, and 
claiming that the plaintiff could not partition the prop-
erty because she 'vas already bound to convey the prop-
erty to said defendants by said contract (R. 21). 
Trial was had on the is.sues of whether or not such 
a contract did exist, and that question being resolved 
in favor of the defendant, no further proc-eedings by way 
of partition were had (R. 99). 
Plaintiff's l\fotion for New Trial \Yas denied De-
cember 10, 1957, (R. 120) and this appeal is taken. 
ST.A_TE~IENT OF FACTS 
Ellen S. )loody 'Ya.s the O\\"'ller of an undivided one-
fifth ( 1/5) interest in the David Sn1ith Sheep Ranch 
situated in ,,.,.asatrh and Duchesne Counties (R. 69, 7). 
TIH~re ''"erP four other brotl1ers and sisters of EllenS. 
~I oody O\\Tning thP other undiYided one-fifth (1/5) inter-
P~h": .J o~Pph, Jo~PphiiH\ 1\.arhel and David Sn1ith. These 
l'ivP ehilur()n r(\e()ived their interests in part \Vhen their 
fathPr djpd and in part hy later c.onyeyanee by their 
1not her, .:\lieP (ireen"Tood Sn1ith of her do,Yer interest. 
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David had acquired the intere.st of Joseph by a prior 
transaction so that for all practical purposes, David was 
the owner of two-fifths (2/5) interest at about the time 
that the events pertinent to this matter transpired. 
David Smith, a£ter the death of his father and after 
his mother became incompetent to take care of the 
sheep ranch, undertook the management of the ranch. 
Ellen Moody assumed the care of he1r mother, Alice 
Greenwood Smith, for the several years prior to her 
n1other's death in 1953. 
After considerable negotiations, conveyances and the 
writing of various documents, most of which the Appel-
lant was precluded from presenting at the trial except 
by way of proffer of proof, a Lease Agreement was 
executed between the Appellant and David G. Smith, 
Lessee, predecessor of the Respondents, Juanita Smith 
and Dennis Smith. The lease is marked as Exhibit "1". 
Attached to the lease is a document designated as a 
"Contract of Sale." The trial court upheld Respondents' 
contention that the "Contract of Sale" bound the Appel-
lant to sell the property covered by the Le.ase Agree-
ment within such time as the lease provided and under 
the terms of said alleged contract. 
Appellant attempted to show that the various nego-
tiations leading up to, and continuing after the exe-
cution of the lease precluded the existence of any intent to 
execute the contract (R. 228, 235, Exs. "A" & "B") (R. 
240-253, Exs. C, D, E, F & G) R. 255-261, Ex. H). By the 
san1e record .and exhibits, Appellant tried to show that 
the "Contract of Sale" wa:s impossible to perform. This 
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evidence was not admitted and is shown as a p·roffer of 
proof. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING 
THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS HAD EXE-
CUTED AN OPTION WITH A CONTRACT TO PUECHASE. 
A. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND HOLDING 
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION AND CONTRACT WAS ON 
ITS FACE IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANCE, AMBIGU-
OUS AND THUS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
B. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADlVIITTING THE TESTI-
MONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH MOODY AND 
CHARLES MOODY TOGETHER WITH EXHIBITS "A,'' "B," 
"C," "D," "E,'' AND "G," TO SHOW THE ALLEGED OPTION 
AND CONTRACT WAS NOT IN FACT EXECUTED. 
c. 
THE COURT ERRED IN l\IAKING AND ENTERING 
FINDINGS OF FA·CT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1, 2 and 3, AS NOT BEING 
SUPPORTED BY THE ADl\IISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
_A_Rt1l~l\IEXT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING 
THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS HAD EXE-
CUTED AN OPTION "'"ITH A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE. 
rl,hi~ ae.t ion renters around the question of "~hether 
or not thP docun1Pn t n1arked as Exhibit Hl ~~ is a binding 
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opti1on requiring Ellen Smith Moody to convey her one-
fifth ( 1/5) interest in the ranch to the Respondents, 
Smith, according to the terms of said Exhibit. The 
Exhibit was introduced by Re~spondents over the objec-
tion o.f the Appellant (R. 199) (Ex. 1), Appellants 
contending that said document on its face was nothing 
1nore than a lease. Appellants contend further that 
neither on the evidence introduced by Respondents and 
admitted by the court, on evidence introduced by Ap-
pellants and admitted by the court, nor on evidence intro-
duced by Appellants and not admitted by the court can 
the decision be upheld .as a matter of fact or of law. 
This gener-al proposition is discussed under the following 
points: 
A. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND HOLDING 
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION AND CONTRACT WAS ON 
ITS FACE IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANfCE, AMBIGU-
OUS AND THUS NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
The Lease is dated December 1, 1950 (Ex. 1), and 
attached to the Lease is what is designated as a "Contract 
of Sale" and is described as Exhibit "1 ". In considering 
the impossibility of performing the alleged option and 
contract, we should consider first of all the various dates 
\\rhich were set forth in said attached "Contract of Sale": 
(See Exhibit 1) 
1. The "Contract" 1n its paragraph 1, indicates a 
date of execution of J.anuary l, 1950, nearly one year 
prior to the execution date of the Lease. 
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· 2. The date of posses'Sion in paragraph 2 of the 
''C,ontract'' is also stated a.s being January 1, 1950. 
3. The dates upon which the payments under the 
contract are to be made ·are shown in paragraph 2 of 
the "Contract" as commencing on November 1, 1951 and 
falling on successive dates of November 1 each year 
thereafter. 
4. In paragraph 3 of the "Contract," the date of 
delivery of an abstract is established 8$ July 1, 1951, 
and the requirement of the certification date on the 
abstract date is set at June 1, 1951. 
5. The date of delivery of various documents and 
deeds under paragraph 4 of the "Contract" is established 
as February 15, 1951. 
6. Paragraph 6 of the "Contract" requires pay-
Inent of all taxes after January 1, 1950. 
7. The date of ackno\vledg:tnent is sho-wn as the 
________ day of November, 1950. 
It is manifest fro1n an exanrination of the above 
dates that performance of the HContract ~~ "~as al"Tays 
i1npossible fron1 the inception of the Lease, on Decem-
ber 1, 1950 and thence for"\\,.~ard ..... \t no time could the 
date of possession, the date of ackno,vledgement, the 
date of exceution nor tl1e date of tl1e eoininenceinent of 
the pay11tcnt of taxe.s been co1nplied "~ith ..... \re "~e to say 
that all of said dates n1ay be ignored as uni1nportant or 
i11nnn.terial pnrts of the contract~ The ans\Yer is, of 
courS(', obvious. Since these dates are ilnportant, \Yho 
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now will establish these dates~ Will it be the court with 
no evidence whatsoever before it by way of assistance 
or will it be the parties by .a ~subsequent ~agreement~ 
The dates upon which payments are to be made, the 
date of delivery of the abstract and the date of the 
delivery of the escrow papers were all at least possible 
of performance on December 1, 1950 when the Lease 
was executed, but within one year they too bec.ame im-
possible of performance. Who now is to determine what 
these dates shall be~ How can we now determine how 
much time should be given to furnish an abstract of title, 
or what the continuation date of the abstract should be~ 
If the abstracts are to be brought to date on some day 
in 1958, there, of course, will be additional costs for 
entries which may be of record since June 1, 1951, the 
original date established in the "Contract." This, will 
be an additional burden forced on the Appellants by an 
arbitrary selection of date·s by the court or by .an entirely 
new agreement between the parties. In either event, 
we are adding to the "Contract" obligations not covered 
under the original terms. 
The terms of the alleged contract leave very material 
matter.s entirely omitted or at least in a very ambigu-
ous and uncertain status. No evidence was introduced by 
the Respondents to indicate how the various dates were 
to be handled. And, of course, under the objections made 
by Respondents when Appellants attempted to explain 
the uncertainties and ambiguities, Respondents could not 
consistently have introduced any such evidence. The 
only evidence available in any way to explain th i ~ "Con-
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tract" ·was offered by Appellants, but was rejected by 
the court. 
The arbitrary manner in which these various dates 
could be designated is graphically evidenced in the judg-
ment entered by the court. At paragraph 3, thereof (R. 
105, 106), the court has inserted as the commencement 
of payments under the alleged contract, the 5th day of 
October, 1957, and has ordered that payments shall be 
made commencing each year on the same date. What 
is the basis for the court ordering payments to com-
mence on October 5 ~ Certainly nothing in the record 
gives the court any indication as to why this date should 
be se~lected. Might the court not have established a much 
later date, giving the Respondents additional benefits by 
way of the use of the money until payment is actually 
commenced~ 
The Court has not in its Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law or J udgn1ent indicated the date after which 
the Respondents shall pay the taxes; the court has not 
indicated the date upon which the abstract of title shall 
be deter1nined ; the court has not indicated the date to 
'vhich the abstract searcl1 shall be brought; the court 
h.a~ not indicated the date upon "\Yhicl1 the various papers 
and rlocun1ents are to be deliYered to esc.ro"\Y. Xeedless 
to ~a~~, therP is no proyision ''"·hatsoeYer indicating the 
1na.nnPr of perfor1naJ1ee of these Yarious phases of the 
all('g·pd eon tract. a 1l of \Yhich giYes rise to further dis-
put(\ interpretation and possible legal proceedings to 
rix tlH'~P additional dates. 
It i~ 11utni t\}~t, tht'r<:\fore, that the parties could not 
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have intended to be bound by the do-cuments introduced 
by Respondents as Exhibit "1" and relied upon by Re-
spondents as the basis for the alleged contract. It is 
fundamental under contract law that the contract must be 
performable under irts terms. 
Even if the parties had intended this document to 
be an option and a contr.act, said contract would have 
to fail because of uncertainty since it cannot be per-
formed in the manner in which its terms attemp~t to pro-
vide. 
The question resolves itself into whether or not the 
absence of the various dates is of sufficient importance 
to render the contract unenforceable because of their 
absence. It is conceivable that perhaps one date in and 
of itself under certain circumstances might not be of 
such importance. IIowever, where, as in this case, the 
entire contr,act and every phase of :its performance is 
purportedly governed by dates, the taking away of those 
dates does render the contract unenforceable. Therefore, 
'vhen the Respondents had rested their case on the 
Counter-Claim with only the· introduction of Exhibit "1' ', 
the court should have dismissed the Counter-Claim and 
proceeded to the matter of partition. The Respondents' 
evidence had not shown any contract or option suscepti-
ble of performance \vhich would require the conveyance 
of the interest of Ellen Smith Moody, thus preventing 
her partition action. 
In const1uing any alleged contract, the court must 
give consideration to all parts of the contract and can-
not ignore portions thereof in order to uphold the con-
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tract as a valid document p~articularly when the portions 
ignored are material to the performance of the contract. 
Thus in this case, the court cannot ignore the various 
dates of p·erformance, precluding Appellants from testi-
fying concerning the ambiguities and thereafter insert 
provisions of its own choice. However, if there are am-
biguities and uncertainties, the parties must be given 
the opportunity of adducing evidence to show what was 
intended by the p·arties to the contract. If the court 
states and holds that the contract is valid and needs no 
explanation, then the court cannot insert therein various 
dernands governing its performance. Particularly the 
court cannot insert a date of performance, as it has done, 
in the Order requiring Appellants to specifically perform 
the contract. If, however, the court cannot order per-
forinance of the contract because of uncertainties, then 
it 'vould follo'v that evidence should be adduced to show 
the intent of the parties. Burt rs. StringfeUow, -±5 l .... t. 
207, 143 Pac. 234; Beagley z:s. r:. S. Gypsu;n Conzpany, 
236 Pac. 2d 783; Ill atlz is vs. ~fads en, 1 Ut. 2d 46; Gates 
l'S. Daines, 3 lTt. 95; .and B'ryaut rs. Deseret }.. .... eu·s, 233 
Pac. 2d 335. 
Further1nore, if there are unc.ertainties or ambigui-
tir~, these a1nbiguities n1ust be construed against the 
dra\rer of tl1P doeu1nent. Bryant Y. Deseret ~Teu·s, sup'l"a. 
The doeu1nent here 'vas dra\\11 by DaYid Sn1ith and his 
attorne~·~, (),ren ... ~ '\7a.rd, and thus should be eonstrued 
in it~ interpn)tation against the dra:\rers (R. 260). 
In the consideration of the docun1ents themselYes, 
it i~ nppnrent thnt they nre i1npos.sible of perfor1nance 
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and ~as is stated in Yankton Sioux Tribe vs. United States, 
272 U.S. 351, "the same rule undoubtedly is that where 
there is -a legal impossibility of performance appearing 
on the f.ace of the promise, there is no contract in respect 
of it." See also Jones vs. U.S. 96 U.S. 24 and Hull vs. 
Brandywine Fiber Products Company, 121 Fed. 2d 108. 
The two documents, ie, the lease and the attached Con-
tract of Sale, must be possible of performance, and can-
not be inconsistent. If they do not meet these two require-
ments, they do not constitute an agreement between the 
parties. 
B. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE TESTI-
MONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH MOODY AND 
CHARLES MOODY TOGETHER WITH EXHIBITS "A," "B," 
"C," "D," "E," AND "G," TO SHOW THE ALLEGED OPTION 
AND CONTRACT WAS NOT IN FACT EXECUTED. 
The Appellant attempted to introduce considerable 
evidence to explain to the court why the document desig-
nated as "Contract of Sale" was attached to the Lease 
and still was not intended to be a binding option and 
contract. In other words, the Appellants did attempt to 
explain why an incomplete, uncertain, impossible to per-
form and ambiguous document was attached to the exe-
cuted lease. The Appellants had three witnesses, Joseph 
Smith, Ellen Smith Moody and Charles 11oody and in 
addition, Appellants introduced various documents. The 
testimony and documents all would have shown that at 
the time of the execution of the Lease, David Smith and 
Appellant did not intend to bind the:mselves by the docu-
ment attached to the Lease. 
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The testimony of said witnesses and the said docu-
ments offered were all objeCJted to by Respondents and 
the objections sustained upon two general grounds: 
(.a) That the witnesses attempting to testify were 
barred by Section 78-24-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amende,d, known as the "Dead Man's Statute"; and, 
(b) That the evidence was an attempt to vary the 
terms of a written contract or could not be admitted be-
c.ause the conversations and documents were merged in 
the final contract. 
In discussing the propriety of the court's ruling, let 
us first look at the evidence which should have been be-
fore the court, but which was excluded. 
The testimony of Joseph Smith, had it been admitted 
by the court, would have shown that at the time the 
Lease was executed by David Smith and the .A_ppellants, 
the condition of the property as to the acreage involved 
w.as uncertain because of a dispute \Yith the :\Ioon family 
concerning the boundary bet,veen the Smith R.anch and 
the ~loon property (R. :229, :230~ :231~ 232). This un-
certainty \vas further eYideneed by an Exhibit " .. :.'\.~', a 
large 1nap sho,ving the acreage in dispute and showing 
the d ifferenee bet,veen the actual desc.ription of the 
prop(•rty and the de~eriptiou of the property in the al-
lPgPd '•Contract of ~ale" .attnehed to the Lease. Exhibit 
··A·~ nl~o "~a~ rejt\etf'd b~~ the court as innnaterial and as 
an aU ('Inpt to vary the eontraet. The testin1ony of ~Irs. 
l\Lood~· on direct ex~uninatiou by tl1e Respondents con-
eprning thP pa~~nu?nt of tnxt•s by her and the f.ailure 
to pay tn.xPs b~r the RPspondents (R. 218, ~19~ 220, 221, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
222) and Exhibit "B," a Deed from Joseph Smith to 
David Smith showed a discrepancy in the amount of 
acreage conveyed by Joseph Smith to David Smith in the 
original sale of Joseph Smith's intere.st to David Smith 
(R. 232). The foregoing evidence showed that prior to 
the execution of the Lease, nobody knew how much acre-
age and which portions of the described property were 
actually included in the ranch .and thus covered b¥ the 
alleged "Contract of Sale." 
Ellen Smith ~Ioody would have testified that when 
the Lease was executed and prior thereto, David Smith, 
Ellen Smith Moody and Charles 1\foody had various con-
versations indicating that in the prior negotiations and 
at the signing of the Lease, the parties had not intended 
to consider the attached document as a binding contract 
(R. 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242). Exhibit "C" was intro-
duced as a copy of a le~tter received from David Smith's 
attorneys, indicating that prior attempts at drawing up 
documents had been attempted in this transaction (R. 
242). Exhibit "D", a letter from Ellen Smith Moody 
to D. Ray Owen, dated October 1, 1950, prior to the exe-
cution of the Lease, indica ted the return of a proposed 
"Contract of Sale," further demonstrating the uncer-
tainty and the unsuccessful attempts to arrive .at an 
agreement between the parties (R. 245). Likewise, Ex-
hibit "E" and "F" are letters regarding the transaeti.on 
showing further the attempts at reaching an agreement. 
Exhibit "G" is another letter indicating th.at the pnr-
chase price had not been determined even as late as De-
cember 27, 1951, after the execution of the Lease. 
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Charles Moody testified that he had no interest in 
the property at all and had never had any interest in 
the p-roperty (R. 254). Mr. Moody would have testified 
that in the conversations with Mr. Smith, the "Contract 
of Sale" was never agreed to for various reasons, as are 
set forth in the record (R. 256). In connection with Mr. 
Moody's testimony, Exhibits "G" and "H" were offered 
Exhibit "H" being admitted and Exhibit "G" being ex-
cluded. These t-vvo letters indicate that even after the 
signing of the Lease, there still was no agreement as to 
the purchase of the land. Exhibit "H" is very clear in this 
regard and indicates that the contract before being signed 
must take into account the variou.s obligations owing from 
D.avid to Ellen Moody. These exhibits again indicate the 
lack of agrement between the parties and the lack of 
intent to agree to the te-rms of the alleged Contract of 
Sale. 
Mr. Moody not being an owner of the property and 
1nerely signing the lease agreement as a matter of con-
venience had no interest in the property, in the outcome 
of the partition action nor the dealings with the 
property other than that arising from his relationship 
as husband to Ellen Smith Moody (R. 260). 
In vie'v of the evidence " .. hich 'vould have been ad-
duced by the Appellants, it is eontended herein that such 
Pvidenee, \Yould have conclusiv-ely .sho'vn the absence of 
any agree1nent to consider the alleged Contract of Sale 
as binding on the parties. This evidence "~ould have ex-
l)lainPd the lack of eoncern of the p.a.rties as to the various 
uncertainties eaused by the inco1nplete agreen1ent. 
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This evidence would show that pnor to and even 
after the execution of the Lease, there was uncertainty 
in the minds of David Smith and Appellants as to the 
acreage to be covered by the agreement to thereafter 
be executed. The evidence would further show that the 
parties had not agreed upon a price inasmuch as various 
obligations arising out of the conduct of the Smith Ranch 
and the support, care and maintenance of Alice G. Smith 
had still not been determined between the parties. The 
evidence further would show that the agreement .and 
negotiations were not conclusively consummated, inas-
much as commencing prior to the execution of the Lease 
and continuing on to December 1, 1950 and thereafter, 
the negotiations continued and then merely closed upon 
the death of David Smith. 
We must, therefore, move to a consideration of the 
two principles of law relied upon by Respondents and 
the Court in sustaining Respondents' objections to the 
introduction of Appell,ants' evidence. 
WITNESSES' ALLEGED DISABILITY TO TESTIFY 
UNDER THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE 
Look first at the te.stimony of Joseph Smith. Mr. 
Smith testified without contradiction that he had no 
interest whatsoever in the law suit or in the property 
subject of the law suit (R. 229). Our statute provides 
that the witness to be prevented from testifying must 
be a party to the action or must be directly interested 
in the event thereof, which interest must be adverse to 
those of the guardian, administrator or other grantee 
of the deceased person. The witness, if so disabled, can-
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not testify to matters of fact equally within the knowl-
edge of said witness and the deceased person. None 
of the requirements of the statute are evident as to 
Joseph Smith and thus his testimony and he as a witness 
are not disqualified by said statute. 
The statute is hereinafter set forth: 
Title 78-24-2, Utah Code An1~otated: 
"The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
( 3) A party to any civil action, suit or pro-
ceeding and any person directly interested in the 
event thereof, and any person from, through or 
under whom such party or interested person de-
rived his interest or title or any part thereof, 
\vhen the adverse pa1iy in such action, suit or 
proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, 
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person, 
or as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee 
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, 
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such 
heir. legatee or devisee, as to any statement by. 
or transaction "~ith. such dee-eased, in5ane or in-
coinpetent person, or n1atter of fact 'Yhate\er, 
"Thieh n1ust haYe been equally within the knowl-
edge of both the "~itness and such insane, inconl-
petent or deceased person. unless such witness is 
called to testify thereto by such adYerse party so 
elai1ning or opposing. suing or defending, in such 
aetion, suit or proceeding.'~ 
TlH"\rc i~ no doubt 'vhntsoeYer tl1at Joseph Snrith 
had long since conye~~l"\d a'vny a:ny interest he had in 
tliP ranelt propert~-. This i~ sho,vn by the Stipulation 
(lonct\rni11g the fee title to the property (R .. 7, 69). 
''7"i th referL~nce to the testiinony of Ellen Sn1ith 
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~Ioody, Appellants contend that she is not disqualified 
under said statute for the following reasons. The very 
document upon which Respondents predicate their 
Counter-Claim w.as identified by Mrs. Moody, and by 
stipulation the document was introduced, showing her 
signature. Mrs. Moody was called as a witness by the 
Respondents and interrogated concerning the payment 
of taxes on the property subject of the law suit. This 
obligation arises out of the document in question and 
involves a portion of the land covered by the alleged 
'"Contract". All of this necessarily involves an interpre-
tation of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
It should be pointed out also that :L\Irs. 1loody's deposi-
tion was taken by Respondents in this case, although it 
was not published. The Respondents having called Mrs. 
~Ioody to testify concerning the transaction and particu-
larly the payment of the taxes under the alleged docu-
ments, having introduced the document with her signa-
ture attached, thereby waived any disability to which 
she might have been subject under the above mentioned 
statute. At 64 A.L.R. 1157, there are numerous cases 
annotated indicating that when a document is introduced 
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the docu-
Inent can be testified to by the adve,r.se party. The cases 
therein cited are: Hoes vs. Nagele, 51 N.Y. Supp. 233; 
Hopkins vs. Clark, 35 N.Y. Hupp. 360; Watson vs. Dodson, 
121 S.W. 209 (Tex); Robertson vs. O'Neill (Wash.) 120 
Pac. 885. 
In the case of Clayton vs. Ogden State Bank, 82 
Ut. 564, the court in holding that the mere taking of a 
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deposition does not constitute waiver of the disqualifica-
tion said, however: 
"The question of competency is one to be de-
te,rmined by the court at the tlln.e the evidence is 
offered and then it is not a question of waiver, 
but one as to whether 'such witness be called to 
testify ...... by such adverse party.'" 
The Court thus indicated that if the witness is called 
the waiver is effected and it is not the testimony to 
which the witness will testify that is material in determin-
ing whether or not the disqualification has been waived. 
The case of Burk vs. Peter, 115 Ut. 58, involved the 
question of whether or not in an action on a Promissory 
Note, the administratrix by offering the note in evidence 
had waived the disqualification of the defendant to tes-
tify concerning the transaction surrounding the execution 
of said note. The Court said : 
"However, the waiver of incompetency totes-
tify is limited to the matters, facts or transactions 
proved by the introduction of endenee by the 
representative or by "~itnesses called on behalf of 
the estate and does not extend to all transactions 
\Vi thin the issues of tl1e case as contended by Ap-
pellant. See Carter 1·s. Curlezr Creanzery Con~­
pauy. 16 ,~~ash. 2d 47G, 134 Pac. 2d 66, on page 
7:3 of the Pacific. Report "~herein tl1at court said: 
'1 t n1a~~ be conceded that ~\ppellant ( representa-
t i YP of a deeedent) did introduce certain testi-
lllOn~· relatiYe to transactions and conversations 
"·i th the deePased and as to those transactions first 
dPveloped hy ..:\ppellant the benefit of the statute 
"·ns "~aiYt)d and Respondents had the right to 
introdue.P evidence relatiYe to those transactions 
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and all other circumstances necessary to explain 
them. But although the statute may have been 
waived as to those particular transactions opened 
up by Appellant, the waiver does not extend to un-
related transactions and conversations. Croft vs. 
Security State Bank, 54 S.D. 325, 223 N.W. 208; 
Wilkins vs. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31; 
Nolty's Adm'r. vs. Fultz, 261 Ky. 516, 88 S.W. 
2d 35.'" 
It should be noted that Justice Latimer in his con-
curring opinion states: 
''While I believe the restrictions imposed by 
the statute can be waived by the protected party, 
I do not believe the waiver should be extended 
beyond the scope of the matter brought into issue." 
The Respondents by introducing the Lease Agree-
ment and the alleged contract immediately put into issue 
the validity of that ·contract and the question of whether 
or not the alleged contract had actually been executed. 
As we have pointed out heretofore, the document in and 
of itself is uncertain in its content and is susceptible 
of explanation by the evidence concerning surrounding 
circumstances. In other words, the matters attempted to 
be shown by Appellants are not excluded as a matter of 
evidentrary rule and thus might properly be made the 
subject of testimony of this witness. The very issue raised 
by the pleadings and by the introduction of Exhibit "1" 
1nust be gone into by the Appellants, otherwise there is 
no issue whatsoever. The Inatters atte1npted to be coveT-
ed by the testimony of Ellen Smith Moody go to the very 
essence of whether or not the document introduced w.as 
executed. This is not an unrelated matter and is certainly 
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part of a transaction opened up by Resp~ondents by the 
introduction of Exhibit "1", by the testimony of Juanita 
Smith and by the calling as a witness of Mrs. Moody 
herself. 
With reference to the qualification of Charles Moody 
as a witness, Appellants contend that by reason of his 
disinterest in the real property he is qualified to testify 
concerning the trans~action involving the execution of 
the alleged contract. Charles Moody is not the owner of 
any interest in the property and never has been, as is 
indicated in the Stipulation (R. 69, 254). 
The Courts hold that a husband is competent to 
testify and the mere fact that he would ultimately re-
ceive property by inheritance from his 'vife did not give 
him ~an intere:st adverse· to the estate. See 58 A1n. Jur. 
195 and the case of Mower vs. Mower, 64 Ut. 260. 
Therefore, in view of the above authorities, Appel-
lants contend that each of the witnesses and the e\idence 
which they identified should have been admitted as 
competent evidence and that the disqualification pro,ided 
under the '~Dead ~Ian's Statute" should not appl~T to these 
witnesses. Even were we to exclude the verbal testimony 
of the three witne:sses, certainly the letteTs are not sub-
ject to the san1e possible disqualification as are the con-
versations of the "~itnesses . ..._~s has been indicated, the 
purpose of the statute is to protert the deceased person 
.again.st untrue state1nents not rapable of verification. 
The letters, of course, speak for the1nselves and eould 
not be subjeet to variation. 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE 
ALLEGED CONTRACT OF SALE 
The court sustained objections of the Respondents to 
much of the testimony and evidence introduced by Ap-
pellants on the grounds that the alleged Contract of Sale 
was the final contract and that under the Statute of 
Frauds .and under the Parol Evidence Rule, no evidence 
could be introduced to vary the· terms of the alleged 
contract. Appellants have pointed out heretofore that 
the alleged contract on its face was impossible of per-
formance and that, therefore, there was no contract. Thus 
the alleged contract could not he subject of the court's 
order ·of specific performance. The point herein pre-
sented by Appellants goes to the admissibility of evi-
dence tending to show that the contract was never in 
existence as such. 
The question of parol evidence and the varying of 
a \Vritten contract conte·mplates an agreement which the 
parties recognize was in effect, that is, an integrated 
agreement. Appellants recognize the rule that ordinarily 
parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of an 
integrated agreement. This general rule, of course, is 
subject to the exceptions wherein the agreement is am-
biguous or uncertain and thus warrants explanation of 
some kind. The cases cited in support of that rule have 
been included heretofore. 
The primary rule, however, relied upon by Appel-
lants is that evidence can be introduced to show that an 
agreement although written out and apparently on its 
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f~ace fully executed, w.as in fact never intended to be 
executed. In support of this rule., the best statement and 
holding can be found in the case of Sams vs. Feldman, 
68 N.W. 2d 780 (Mich. 1955). This case involved a con-
tract for the sale of real property and a preceding oral 
agreement or statement to the effect that the property 
was to be sold to another party. The court held that 
the prior oral agreements would be admissible to sho"' 
that the written contract was never intended to take 
effect. The court stated: 
"In the situation presented the question goes 
to the very existence of the contract itself and this 
is true whether the contract is or is not required to 
be in writing under the Statute of Frauds. The 
taking of parol on this issue neither varies nor 
contradicts the writing but goes rather to the coin-
mencement of the obligation. Anomalous it would 
be if the existence of a contract 'vere to bar parol 
in a situation in which the very issue is whether 
or not there is any contract in existence. The 
courts, accordingly freely hear parol in such cases 
as w.as pointed out in the \V.hite Showers Ine. 
case, supra. Nor is the taking of parol exc-lusive of 
contracts required to be in writing under the Stat-
ute of Frauds. "[Tpon theory, the arguments that 
such contracts should follo"\Y a different rule does 
not commend itself to us. The reasons for the 
rule are of equal validity as applied to contracts 
required to be in "\Yriting under the Statute of 
Fraud.s. Accordingly, parol was held as to a con-
dition precedent in a land eontract case in this 
state in Rothstein vs. ''T eeks, 224 Mieh. 548, 195 
N.W. 49. For similar holdings in land contract 
cases in other jurisdictions, see .... \.lien vs. ~Iar-
ciano, 79 R,.I. 98, SJ At. 2d 4:25 : Dependa.built 
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Homes, Inc. vs. Hiaettel, 81 Ohio App. 422, 76 
N.E. 2d 616; B.all vs. Wright, 118 Colo. 410, 195 
Pac. 2d 739; Restatement c·ontracts, para. 241.n 
The case of Ball vs. Wright, 195 Pac. 2d, 739 (Colo. 
1948), involved a similar situation wherein oral state-
ments were admitted to show that a written contract was 
not to be binding. The court said: 
"The defense of no contract because requisite 
conditions to its effectiveness a~e not complied 
with, and oral proof of such conditions, is not 
unknown to the law nor the rule applicable thereto 
in doubt. 'The rule excluding parol evidence has 
no place in .any inquiry unless the court have be-
fore it some ascertained paper beyond question 
binding and of full effect. Hence parol evidence 
is permi.ssible to show conditions precedent which 
relate to the delivery or taking effect of the instru-
ment ... for this is not oral contradiction or 
variation of the written instrument but goes to 
the very existence of the contract and tends to 
show that no valid and effective contract ever 
existed .... ' 32 C.J.S. Evidence, Para. 935, p. 
857 : Rothstein vs. Weeks, 224 lvfich. 548, 195 
N.W. 49, 51." 
See also following the sa1ne rule these cases : Buren-
lzeide v. L. F. Wall, ( 1955) Colo. 281 Pac. 2d 1000; Stock 
vs. il1eek, 221 Pac. 2d 15 (Cal. 1950); O.J.R. vs. Dwights 
Estate, 205 Fed. 2d 298 (1953) Cert. Denied 346 U.S. 
871, \vherein Augustus l-.J. Hand stated: "Facts recited 
in an integrated agreement may, of course, be shown 
to be untrue even by the parties themselves. Restatement 
Contracts, Para. 244."; Pet Milk Oorttpany vs. Boland, 
175 Fed. 2d 151, C. C. A. (Missouri); Union Oil Oon~pany 
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of California vs. Union Sugar Company, 173 Pac. 2d 700 
(Cal.); LaCava vs. Breedlove, 174Pac. 2d 880; Bowen vs . 
. Z~e-rdinger, 92 N.Y. Supp. 566 N.Y.; Sme.low vs. Dicker-
son, 54 Atl. 2d 883 (Penn.) 
In 3 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, para. 
634., it is stated: 
"The parol evidence rule does not become 
applicable unless there is an integration of the 
agreement of contract, that is, unless the parties 
have assented to a certain writing or writing as 
the statement of the agreement or contract be-
tween them. Accordingly, it may be shown by parol 
evidence not only that a writing was never exe-
cuted or delivered as a contract or that the val-
idity of the agreement was impaired by . . . . 
mistake . . . and that the parties .agreed by parol 
that the writing in question should not become 
effective until some future day .... " 
Certainly in view of the rule upheld by the author-
ities above, Appellants should have been able to introduce 
evidence to show that the alleged Contract of Sale \Y~s 
never intended to have been executed. It is not a question 
of v.arying the written contract as n1uch as it is a question 
of determining that the contract \Yas not intended to 
be a contract. Certainly the testnnony of the three \Yit-
nesses, together 'Yith the docmnents identified and in-
troduced indicate that the parties could not have intended 
to bind themselves by the alleged "Contract of Sale.'' It 
should be pointed out that no evidence 'YhatsoeYer was 
jntroduced by Respondents to indicate that the contract 
was intended to be executed, other than the docu1nent 
itself. l\fatters concerning the contract price, area to be 
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conveyed, .and questions of delivery of the Warranty 
Deeds were all shown by the documents and testimony to 
be left undecided as a matter of agreement. Should Ap-
pellants be foreclosed from introducing this evidence to 
show that the agreement was never consummated~ We 
think not. 
c. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING 
FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1, 2 and 3, AS NOT BEING 
SUPPORTED BY THE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
This point has been previously covered under the 
discussion of Points A and B, and need only be briefly 
alluded to at this point in the brief. 
The only evidence adduced by the Respondents in 
support of their Counter-Claim is the incomplete and 
impossible to perform Lease and "Contract of Sale", 
marked ~s Exhibit "1". The very documents are impos-
sible of performance by their terms and the Respond-
ents have failed to produce any evidence upon "\Vhich the 
court could possibly determine that the contract is valid 
and susceptible of specific performance. 
It is well accepted that a contract to be specifically 
performed must be definite and certain in its material 
terms. In the case of Otis Oil & Gas Corporation vs. 
1l1aier, 284 Pac. 2d 653, the court s.aid: 
"The court will not make a contract for the 
parties. The contract made by then1 must gener-
ally be enforced, if enforced at all, according to 
its terms ..... Thus it is said in 49 Am. Jur., 
Para. 171, P. 194: 'In rendering a decree of spe-
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cific performance, the court has no power to de-
cree performance in any other manner than ac-
cording to the agreement of the parties. The court 
should not assume to make a new contract for the 
partie:s and then decree its sp·ecific performance, 
or undertake to compel the defendant to do some-
thing he did not contract or agree to do, but 
should enforce the contract in question according 
to its terms or not at all.' " 
In the case of Owens vs. Wilson, 273 Pac. 895, 897, 
the court held that where the contract did not provide 
for a definite commencing date for the oil drilling, no 
specific performance would be allowed. The court said: 
"An agreement to make a contract in the 
future is, of course, no contract at all because the 
minds of the parties have not met upon tlE~ 
terms.'' 
In the case of Bonk vs. Boyajian, 274 Pac. 2d 948, 
the court in denying specific performance stated: 
"Where in a business transaetion an import-
ant item is reserved for future determination, no 
enforceable obligation is thereby created for 
'neither law nor equity provides a remedy for 
breach of an agreen1ent to agree in the future.· 
.... In the Ablett case, 43 C.al. 2d ----------------------------
272 Pac. 2d, 276, the court points out ·an option 
agreement which lea Yes an essential term to future 
agreement is not enforceable.' The court 1nay not 
i.Inply or speculate upon what the parties "' .. ill 
agree. . . . . Staten1:ent of the rule and the reason 
therefore is to be found in 1 TT1illiston. Contracts, 
(1936) Sec. 45, p·.131 ..... '~ 
See also Crouch vs. Bischoff, 2SO Pae. 2d 419 .and Brug-
geman vs. Soll.'ol_. 2()5 Pac. ~d 575. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
Certainly there is no foundation in fact or in law 
for the trial court to have ordered specific performance 
of the alleged contract when as a matter of fact and of 
law there w.as no enforcible agreement between the 
partie:s. The court eould only require performance by 
inserting into the contract its own terms. The court did 
insert its own terms, but still did not insert enough pro-
visions to make the contract ·complete by any means. 
~1any elements of the contract are still not definite 
enough for performance. 
SUMMARY 
The instrument, Exhibit "1", on its face could not 
at the time of execution of the Lease in December, 1950, 
and cannot now be performed. Respondents had the 
burden of proof of showing .a eontract which was defin-
ite, which had been -exeeuted, and which could be per-
formed under specific performance. The Respondents 
failed in every respect in establishing such a contract. 
The instrument upon which Re:spondents base their 
entire case would have to be explained in order to dem-
onstrate why such a document would have been attached 
to the Lease Agree1nent. The only logical and .actual 
explanation was attempted by Appellants by offering 
evidence and testimony to show that the original parties 
had never intended to execute n1ore than the 1nere Lease 
Agreement, vvithout further negotiations. All of this evi-
dence was excluded by the court. Had the evidence been 
ad1nitted .as it properly should have, the evidence would 
have been conclusive that there never was a complete 
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and integr-ated Lease and Option to Purchase suseeptible 
nf specific performance. 
Appellants respectfully request that the case be re·-
manded to the District Court for re-trial and that the 
evidence proffered by the Appellants be admitted and 
considered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAl\I 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys for Appellants 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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